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Mental Accounting and Remittances: 
A  Study of Malawian Households  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we use a behavioural approach to studying household consumption behaviour in Malawi. In 
particular we are interested to know whether households use mental accounting when consuming different 
categories of good. It is useful for assessing the impact of remittances on household consumption 
behaviour.  We use 1998 cross-sectional data to find the following key results: (i) mental accounting 
systems are in operation. Remittance income exhibits a high marginal propensity to save, (ii) household 
income influences consumption habits, (iii) receipt of remittance income impacts on saving and spending 
habits. This is in line with the theory of remittances and corresponding mental accounting theory, and, 
finally, (iv) both remittances and loans are used for consumption smoothing and investment purposes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Remittances are commonplace in Malawi with over 20% of households receiving an average of 43% of 
their total non-business income from this source
2
. It reflects the importance of such transfers for 
developing countries in general (Ratha, 2003; Gammeltoft, 2002) fow which studies have shown that 
households do not use remittances in the same way as other income sources (Adams, 1991, 2005). The 
simple receipt of remittances may also be capable of modifying households’ consumption choices (Cox 
Edwards and Ureta, 2003). 
Given that remittances alter household expenditure, studies seek to test and measure the impact of 
these transfers on household consumption choices. Despite the fact that this is in conflict with economic 
theory of consumption such as the lifecycle-permanent income hypothesis (LC-PIH). A notable exception 
is found in Adams (2002) who shows that households exhibit a higher marginal propensity to save out of 
more risky income sources. 
We propose an alternative explanation for the observed differences in marginal propensities to 
consume out of remittance income compared to other income sources; that of mental accounting. Under 
this theory, derived from Shefrin and Thaler (1988), households keep different financial accounts (real or 
metaphorical) out of which different goods are consumed. Income is placed in one account or “pot” or 
another depending partly upon its source, allowing us to observe different marginal propensities to 
consume different goods out of each income source. 
Remittances lend themselves to an analysis in the mental accounting framework. In some cases 
they come with conditions attached (“use this money to educate my little brother”), in other cases they are 
used as a form of income pooling, mutually reducing risk and helping to smooth consumption
3
 potentially 
altering consumption behaviour. Remittances may thus be used for or encourage investment in “useful” 
areas such as education, health, nutrition and savings, or may be seen as “manna from heaven” and 
encourage non-productive behaviour (Kozel and Alderman, 1990 in Chami et al., 2005). 
This is the first time that the mental accounting hypothesis has been tested qualitatively for a 
developing economy. Mental accounting is important for government policy as well as for NGOs and 
banks trying to mobilise savings and encourage borrowing. If lack of consumption out of illiquid assets is 
a choice and not forced upon individuals, microfinance institutions need not only to provide liquidity, but 
also change consumption and savings behaviour. It is important to understand whether remittances are 
combined with other sources of income or spent in a particular way. If they are used for different 
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 Authors’ calculations using Malawian Integrated Household Survey (1998). Chipeta and Kachaka (2005) calculate that remittances accounted 
for 6.3% of total daily per capita consumption in Malawi in 1998. Thus, even including business expenditure, this flow of income represents an 
important flow of income for Malawian households. 
3
 See Alderman and Paxson (1992) for a synthesis of the literature on risk and consumption in developing countries. 
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purposes to money from other sources, do these purposes tend to be constructive (such as education) or 
destructive (conspicuous consumption)?  
This paper seeks to answer a couple of questions: Do households’ spending choices conform to 
traditional consumption models in which source of income plays no role, or do households keep “mental 
accounts” consuming differently out of different money pots? What is the role of remittances in 
consumption and savings choices? 
Levin (1998) uses American longitudinal data to find marginal propensities to consume (MPC) for 
different categories of goods out of different assets. He finds that the MPC out of current income is 
around 0.42 with a MPC out of changes in housing value of zero. This is a common empirical result 
which is seen as an anomaly of the lifecycle consumption model. Credit market constraints are often cited 
as an explanation
4
, but Levin suggests that individuals are not credit constrained but rather choose not to 
consume out of these assets. He uses testable differences between the models which allow him to 
discriminate between lifecycle consumption models with liquidity constraints and behavioural models of 
consumption, finding in favour of the latter. Furthermore households use different wealth categories to 
purchase different goods; for example, they are more likely to use liquid wealth such as savings than 
current income to pay for occasional purchases such as vacations.  Although Levin’s findings support the 
fact that individuals choose and are not forced to consume differently out of assets with different levels of 
“temptation”, he does not break down current income into different categories. Thus, he is unable to test 
whether equally liquid income is used for different purposes. 
Adams (2002) uses panel data from a sample of 469 rural Pakistani households to measure 
marginal propensities to save and consume out of income from different sources. He finds that the 
marginal propensity to save out of remittances is higher (at 0.711 for external remittances and 0.589 for 
internal remittances) than that for any other source of income. Although he notes that these results do not 
conform to unmodified lifecycle consumption models, Adams suggests that is due to income volatility 
and risk aversion, noting that income sources with greater variability exhibit greater marginal propensities 
to save. While Adams is able to distinguish between different MPC (or save) out of sources of equally 
liquid income, he does not look at how this income might be spent. 
This paper combines these two approaches, testing traditional lifecycle models against 
behavioural consumption models of mental accounting. It goes on to look at how different sources of 
income are spent with a particular focus on remittances. The results show that, as in Adams (2002), 
remittances are more likely to be saved than income from other sources. Furthermore, they are most likely 
to be used to finance necessities such as food and essential household products. Households do choose to 
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consume out of fixed assets; in particular they use these assets to finance health, education and 
investment. Both remittances and credit are used to smooth consumption
5
 and for investment purposes 
and there is some degree of substitutability between the two. Non-remittance receiving households turn to 
credit to fund basic consumption during difficult periods. Whilst credit is also used for productive 
investment, the receipt of remittances encourages lower-income households to invest in education. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework. Section 3 
discusses the data before proceeding with the empirical analysis, together with discussion of the results. 
Finally, the summary and concluding remarks are drawn in Section 4.   
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The behavioural lifecycle model from which this hypothesis is drawn is proposed in Shefrin and Thaler 
(1988). They suggest that there exist two selves: a “planner”, who maximises utility as per the standard 
neo-classical utility function, and a “doer” who carries out all decisions but who is myopic in nature and 
suffers a psychological “willpower” cost to reducing consumption to the planner’s optimum level. The 
two selves often have mutually inconsistent preferences but coexist at all times. 
Conflict is thus introduced into the standard lifecycle consumption model, which the planner seeks 
to resolve by constraining the doer to act in a way as close as possible to the optimum. The psychological 
cost depends upon the level of consumption, current consumption opportunities and the “temptation 
level” of wealth. This is intuitive; it is more difficult to reduce consumption if it is already low, if the 
consumption opportunity set is large and if wealth is easily spent.  
The unconstrained doer would maximise utility, ut on the opportunity set, Xt, maximising 
consumption and utility in each period t. The planner attempts to intervene but reducing today’s 
consumption carries a psychological willpower cost, wt
6
. Thus doer utility is defined as: 
 
zt= ut -wt            (1) 
Willpower effort is effective if the maximised values of zt and ut are not the same. In this case, the doer 
has successfully reduced consumption today so that it is nearer the planner’s optimal level. Defining θt, a 
“willpower effort” variable indicating the amount of willpower exercised at date t, * t t(c ,X )tθ gives the 
degree of willpower effort required at consumption level ct given the opportunity set Xt.
7
 In order to 
reduce consumption at any level, an increase in willpower is required. Any increase in willpower is 
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 Udry (1990) finds that credit is used for consumption smoothing purposes in Mexico. 
6
 We assume conflict between the planner and the doer. This would arise where the planner’s optimal intertemporal solution requires reducing 
current consumption in order to save for, say, retirement. Note that, the doer and planner are not in conflict per se. A young person earning 
below his or her permanent income level would do well to dissave in order to increase current consumption according to the planner’s optimum. 
7
 The impact of composition of total wealth which influences the “temptation level” or ease with which wealth can be used for consumption 
purposes is ignored here for clarity. 
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painful since the corresponding reduction in consumption reduces zt. Furthermore, increasing willpower 
becomes increasingly painful as additional willpower is applied (this follows also from the assumption of 
concave utility). Formally:  
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Given that the doer will not chose to reduce consumption, the planner imposes constraints in order to 
reduce the opportunity set of the doer, Xt thus reducing the willpower effort required to reduce 
consumption to a given level. This can be achieved by voluntarily imposing external constraints – 
physically placing money in bank accounts which do not permit withdrawal for example (saving for 
pensions)
8
. 
 To reduce the psychological cost of implementing willpower to reduce consumption at any level, 
internal constraints can be imposed and heuristic or “rule-of-thumb” behaviour adopted
9
. Mental 
accounting rules such as “consume out of savings only in event of emergency” or “use remittances to pay 
for the children’s education” are examples of this behaviour. Although such behaviour reduces the 
psychological cost of reducing consumption, there is an additional psychological cost, φ, to breaking the 
rule. The rule will thus be kept if: φ> * t t(c ,X )tθ . 
Psychology literature
10
 suggests that the easiest rules to obey are those which become habits 
(saving for example, may become habitual). Exceptions must be rare and well-defined, and the rules must 
be dynamically stable: it is difficult to break habits
11
. Although such links between behaviour and 
economics are well-established in the context of developed countries, this paper shows that they are also 
relevant for developing countries. 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) divide total wealth into three mental accounts depending upon the 
temptation level of the asset: current spendable income (Y), current assets (A) and future income (F). The 
traditional lifecycle consumption model postulates that the marginal propensity to consume out of 
changes in all three categories is equal. Under the behavioural lifecycle model the different mental 
accounts exhibit different MPC since it is easier to consume out of current income than future income. 
Otherwise put, current income exhibits a higher temptation level than future income. We thus expect to 
observe a much higher MPC out of current income than out of future income. Consumption is no longer a 
function only of total lifetime wealth but also the composition of that wealth: 
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9 Karlsson’s (2003) terms such strategies “willpower strategies”. 
10
 See, for example, Ainslie (1975) or, for a review of other commitment devices, Brocas, Carrillo and Dewatripont (2004) 
11
 Anderson and Nevitte (2006) find that saving behaviour is largely a matter of habit. Furthermore, these habits are, at least in part, learnt in the 
home as a child. 
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Where elasticities are given by the partially differentiating (3) with wealth and consumption 
values in their natural log form. 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Lewis and Winnett (1995) use surveys
12
 to show that the source of 
the income and the amount of income are both important in placing income in one account or another. A 
windfall gain is likely to be placed in the asset account (perhaps savings) while several small gains adding 
up to the same value tend to be placed in the current income account, even when both of these income 
gains are anticipated. Analysing the claim that the large bi-annual bonuses which are the norm in Japan 
contribute to the comparatively high savings rate, Ishikawa and Ueda (1984) estimate MPC from regular 
and bonus income for Japanese workers. They find that for non-recession years, MPC is significantly 
higher for regular income than for bonus income (0.685 versus 0.437); Japanese households habitually 
save over half of their bonus income and these authors conclude that, at least in the short run, habits 
govern household consumption patterns, while Friedman’s Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) may be 
more relevant in the longer run. 
Basing his analysis on mental accounting models, Levin (1998) allows for separable assets. In 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) all assets are combined – an increase in the value of one’s home has the same 
impact on consumption as a stock market gain. Levin (1998) shows that the marginal propensity to 
consume out of different assets differs. 
The maximising agent will thus face the following budget constraint, where he consumes G goods 
and holds K assets
13
: 
,
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Consumption of good g is thus a function of income, Y and the different assets held: 
 
Cg= Cg (Y, A1, A2, … , AK)        (6) 
 
The marginal propensity to consume out of all assets is not equal: 
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where W is total wealth. The marginal propensity to consume different goods out of the same asset is not 
equal: 
1 2
ln( )ln( ) ln( )
...
ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
G
k k k
CC C
A A A
∂∂ ∂
≠ ≠ ≠
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        (8) 
  
In Levin (1998), different forms of wealth have different “temptation levels”. Thus the MPC out 
of liquid assets will be higher than for housing assets since income has a high temptation level. Put 
another way, there are “psychological as well as financial transaction costs associated with spending from 
different types of assets”
14
. In mental accounting terminology, liquid and illiquid assets are placed in 
separate mental accounts (used to purchase different goods, or goods at different times) and there is a 
psychological cost to transferring purchase power between accounts. Levin (1998) also tests the 
hypothesis that liquidity constraints are responsible for the differing MPC rather than behavioural mental 
accounting reasons but concludes in favour of a behavioural explanation. 
This paper extends Levin’s (1998) analysis to include equally liquid income from a variety of 
sources and tests the mental accounting hypothesis for a developing country, Malawi. Formally, a 
household has J income sources and owns K categories of assets: 
 
Cg= Cg (Y1,Y2, …, YJ ; A1, A2, … , AK)        (9)  
 
The agent’s budget constraint becomes: 
, ,
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In addition to allowing MPC out of different wealth categories to differ as in Levin (1998), the MPC out 
of different, equally liquid income sources are not equal. As required by the behavioural lifecycle model, 
the different MPC results, at least in part, from internally (not externally) imposed constraints. The 
varying MPC are due to behavioural reasons such as mental accounting. More specifically agents 
voluntarily choose to spend differently out of different income sources so that a one-unit increase in 
wages/salary is not treated in the same way as the same increase in remittance income
15
. 
This paper seeks to analyse remittance income in the mental accounting framework. It does not 
seek to explain remittances
16
 and does not test different mental accounting models against each other. 
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 Levin (1998) 
15
 Adams (2002) finds that, for Pakistan, remittances exhibit a high marginal investment rate of between 0.59 and 0.91, much higher than for 
other sources of income. 
16
 Unfortunately the data do not allow us to make, the distinction between remittances received by a geographically-split 
household (such as the husband working away while the wife and children stay at home) and a household which receives 
remittances from other relatives. Explaining receipt of remittances is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 9 
Rather, this paper shows that mental accounts exist as a means of controlling behaviour in a developing 
country, Malawi. Furthermore, sources of income are credited to different mental accounts
17
. Remittance 
income in particularly is likely be allocated to its own mental account for a number of reasons. Firstly 
remittances may come with specific conditions attached. Information asymmetry problems aside, the 
remitter may require the receiving household to use their income for purposes such as education or else 
risk losing this income. Secondly, remittances may be considered as either manna from heaven or else the 
product of someone else’s hard work. How remittances are viewed is influenced by culture
18
 and the 
motivation behind the remittance and impacts on the account into which these transfers are placed. In our 
first example, remittance income is likely to be placed in an account used for general or even luxury 
consumption. In the second, remittances tend to be used for productive or constructive purposes such as 
education
19
. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis and Results:  
3.1: Data 
We use data from the Malawian Integrated Household Survey carried out from November 1997 to 
October 1998. It surveys a representative sample of 10,698 households across Malawi. The data include 
detailed income and consumption variables as well as a wide range of household and community 
characteristics. 
The average household has 4.3 members or 3.7 members in per adult equivalent terms. 76% of 
households have children with the mean number of children being 2.01. 75% of household heads are male 
and the average age is 41 years. 74% of household heads are married and 45% work in agriculture. 13% 
of households are urban
20
. 
Average reported non-business household income is Malawian Kwacha (MK) 13,311 annually 
with average consumption equal to MK11,819. Income sources are varied with many households 
receiving income from several sources. Furthermore, many households reported significant non-cash 
consumption. Non-cash food consumption for example was equal to MK8,281 or 62% of non-business 
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 This paper focuses on the unitary household model. We look at the choices households make as a unit depending upon the composition of 
their total spending power, although we recognise the importance of intra-household relations in deciding consumption patterns. 
18
 Hart (2005) suggests that culture is a determinant in how people or households view money and their attitudes towards it. Although some 
forms of mental accounting may be near universal, its exact form is likely to be influenced by cultural and other factors. China for instance has a 
savings culture, whilst Japanese household finance is traditionally organised by females. Religion may play a role where moral codes or duties 
(such as zakat in Islam) encourage particular attitudes. Gender and age may also be factors in determining mental account systems (as well as 
interactions between these two variables and other factors). Financial savoir faire will impact on mental accounting systems and can be related 
to availability of information within a country (institutions and education are important in this aspect as well as the typical financial culture within 
a home). Similarly, consumption needs and choices will influence the mental accounting structure. These needs and choices will, in turn, be 
influenced by surroundings, culture, religion, age, etc. (see Colloredo-Mansfeld, (2005), for a good summary of the link between culture and 
consumption). 
19
 See, for example Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003). 
20
 NSO Classification of rural means that market towns are considered rural with only inhabitants of the four largest cities classified as urban 
dwellers. 
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income. The reader should bear in mind that the analysis that follows considers only cash income and 
consumption despite the fact that a large percentage of total consumption in Malawi is in-kind. 
A total of 2,216 households reported receiving remittance income during the month preceding the 
survey. The mean yearly income from this source was MK4,736 per household. Excluding business and 
cashcrop income, mean remittances are worth 43% of the average total income of receiving households. 
Including business income, median remittance income is equal to 40% of median total income, making 
this estimate of the income share of remittances fairly robust
21
. They are thus an important source of 
income for these households. The mean total income of remittance-receiving households is significantly 
lower than the income of those which do not receive income (MK10,999 against MK14,212). 
Of the 2,216
22
 households which reported receiving remittances, 1,091 received transfers from 
urban areas inside Malawi, the average value of which was MK1,917; 1,105 households received 
remittances with an average value of MK864 from rural Malawi, and 157 households reported receiving 
remittances from outside of Malawi averaging MK7,963. The significant difference between the values of 
remittances received from abroad compared to those send from within Malawi mean that ideally a 
separate analysis should be carried out on these. Unfortunately the low number of households which 
reported receiving such flows mean this is not easy within the context of this study. 
Most households reported owning both liquid assets such as livestock or household appliances and 
illiquid assets such as housing or land. The average value of fixed assets was MK14,838 or 111% of 
average non-business yearly income. 
Consumption is classified into food; farm; clothing; health; fuel; education; general household and 
investment as well as total consumption. The construction of all variables is described in Appendix I. All 
households reporting zero income or zero consumption are necessarily dropped from the sample analysed. 
Mean income, consumption and non-cash consumption and asset ownership as well as information 
regarding household characteristics is presented in Table 1. 
                                Table 1 [about here]. 
3.2: Econometric Methods and Empirical Results:  
Estimation of income elasticites are made using the ordinary least squares method, with each category of 
income and consumption entered separately as required by each test: 
 
' '
0 1 2ln( ) ln( )ig ijC Y Xβ β β ε= + + +        (11) 
where igC  is the ith household’s consumption on goods in category g; ijY denotes the household income 
from the jth income sources, which includes the value of fixed and liquid assets owned by the household. 
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 The median is a more representative estimate due to the very high income of some households which reported business income. 
22
 The sum of households receiving each type of remittance does not add up to 2,216 since some households reported receiving remittances 
from several origins. 
 11 
Finally X represents a vector of control variables including household characteristics such as age of the 
household head, education level of household head and other variables that may influence consumption 
patterns; a set of regional dummies included to capture systematic differences between regions due to 
preferences or culture
23
 and ε  is i.i.d (0, 2σ ) error term.. All other things being equal, a household can 
choose to consume out of changes in the value of these assets by borrowing against their value. 
We regress the log of total consumption against the log of each of the income variables, entered 
separately and then together; the log of fixed (illiquid) and liquid assets; a series of dummies for different 
sources of income and control variables and regional dummies. Mental accounting theory suggests that 
the marginal propensity to consume out of different sources of income is not identical even where the 
income is equally liquid. That is, households choose not to treat income from different sources 
identically. 
 
ln( ) ln( )
,
ln( ) ln( )i j
C C
i j
Y Y
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          (12) 
The results are found in Table 2 below:  
 
     Table 2 [about here]  
 
The coefficients on each income source represent marginal propensities to consume. Thus, in 
Table 2 (regression 1) the marginal propensity to consume out of total income is equal to 0.232. The MPC 
out of fixed and variables assets are 0.133 and 0.136 respectively. These marginal propensities to 
consume may seem low but do not include consumption of durable goods or businesses consumption. 
Including such expenses, Adams (2005) finds marginal propensities to consume of between 0.54 and 0.59 
for Guatemala. The same author finds MPC out of total income of 0.149 for rural Pakistan (Adams, 
2002). The loan dummy is positive, as one would expect; all other things being equal, accessing credit 
increases consumption. Having a business, salary or farming income increases consumption, whilst the 
remittance dummy indicates that households which receive remittances have lower autonomous 
consumption levels than the average. The constant is positive and significant, representing households’ 
autonomous consumption. 
In Table 2 (regression 5) all sources of income are entered simultaneously; since very few 
households receive income from all sources, the number of observations included is reduced. The 
traditional model postulates that the MPCs out of each source of income should be equal. Salary exhibits 
a MPC of 0.295, whilst the MPC out of remittances is 0.191. The MPC out of farming income is positive 
but not significantly different to zero. MPC out of changes in the value of fixed and liquid assets are 
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 Regional differences are important in Malawi for historical reasons. Regions differ significantly with respect to tribal, ethnic and religious 
make-up and voting preferences. There are also important urban-rural divisions. 
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0.165 and 0.131 respectively. Individuals who receive income from all sources appear not to consume 
equally out of them providing initial support for behavioural models. In particular, at the margin, a greater 
proportion of remittance than salary income is saved. 
In Table 2 (regression 6), the impact of remittances on the consumption/savings trade-off is 
further analysed by including an interaction term between the remittances dummy and total income. The 
coefficient on this interaction term is not significant at any conventional levels however it is of the 
expected negative sign suggesting that receipt of remittances encourages prudence, decreasing MPC and 
increases savings. 
Since the marginal propensity to save out of a source of income is equal to ones less MPC, 
globally the marginal propensity to save out of remittances is higher than that for salary income. In Table 
2 (regression 5), the marginal propensity to save out of farming income is, perhaps surprisingly, equal to 
one. A similar, high marginal propensity to save out of remittance income is found by Adams (2002). The 
marginal propensity to save might more justly be termed the marginal propensity to invest as in Adams 
(2002) since it includes not only savings but also consumption of durable goods and business 
consumption which are not included in total consumption. 
Amongst the control variables, education is positive and sometimes significant suggesting more 
human capital leads to higher consumption. Finally, the constant is always positive and significant 
indicating a minimum level is required even where income is zero. In all the regressions regional 
dummies (which are not reported here) tend to be negative and highly significant. The baseline region is 
Lilongwe, the capital, suggesting lower consumption in much of the rest of the country. Notably, the 
coefficients for the other three urban centres (Mzuzu in the north, Zomba and Blantyre in the south) are 
insignificant indicating that the main divide in consumption is between rural and urban areas
24
. 
The LC-PIH model posits that the marginal propensity to consume any given category of good 
will be equal for each income source and change in wealth. Income from a given source is not allocated to 
a particular consumption category. By contrast behavioural, mental accounting models suggest that 
mental accounts are used for specific purposes. Since income from different sources is assigned into 
different mental accounts, the MPC for good (g) out of one source of income will not equal the marginal 
MPC good (h) out of the same source of income. And the MPC for the specific good (g) from source (i) 
will not equal the MPC (g) out of (j). 
ln( ) ln( )
,
ln( ) ln( )
g h
i i
C C
g h
Y Y
∂ ∂
≠ ≠
∂ ∂
         (13) 
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 We prefer not to use a simple rural/urban dummy due to the different magnitudes of the coefficients (results available from 
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The adult equivalent consumption for each of six categories is regressed against each income 
source, relevant income dummies and control variables. The low number of observations is due to the fact 
that few households reported income and consumption in all categories
25
. Nevertheless the lifecycle 
model posits that all income is combined for these households.  
Table 3 [about here]  
 
Results are presented in Table 3 and are generally supportive of the mental accounting hypothesis that 
different income is used for different purposes. For those who receive them, remittances are spent on food 
(with a statistically significant MPC of 0.216), fuel (0.273) and general household items (0.253). 
Remittances appear not to be used for farm, clothing or health expenses. Remittances exhibit lower MPC 
than salary income (0.191 against 0.295 for total consumption) showing that remittance income is either 
saved or used for day-to-day expenses.  
Increased land holdings has a negative impact on the consumption of fuel suggesting households 
which possess more land are better able to cater for their own fuel needs. Interestingly, larger land 
holdings appear not to influence increased farming consumption. This could suggest that a large part of 
farming costs are sunk meaning that there is potential for economy of scale gains from combining farms 
or farming responsibilities. The high MPC for health products out of liquid assets suggests that these 
assets are sold in order to quickly access funds in health emergencies. More education leads to greater 
consumption of all categories except farm and fuel, although the large standard error indicates important 
differences in behaviour. This is perhaps unsurprising, since those with more education are likely to earn 
more, and migrate to cities where their skills can be better exploited, retaining only small farms requiring 
low consumption. 
Since remittances can be used as a form of insurance, helping to smooth consumption and reduce 
risk, the receipt of remittances can change household consumption habits. Thus, households which 
receive remittances will exhibit different MPC to those which do not. In order to focus on these 
differences, each consumption category is regressed against the log of total non-business income 
(excluding remittances), the values of fixed and liquid assets, income source dummies and controls. By 
not limiting the regression to only those households which receive all sources of income the number of 
observations is increased, limiting any selection bias. Furthermore, this allows an analysis of a greater 
                                                 
25
 The presence of sample selection bias has been tested and rejected by placing into each OLS regression relevant Inverse 
Mills Ratios calculated from probit regressions estimating the likelihood of a household having a positive consumption of each 
category of good. Although efforts to test for sample selection bias throughout this paper have generally indicated that the risk 
is minimal, a more thorough examination would require detailed analysis of the causes of poverty in Malawi and the factors 
affecting receipt of remittances, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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range of consumption categories. Where differences in consumption patterns can be observed between the 
two groups, there is some indication that the receipt of remittances alters household behaviour. For 
example the MPC education is higher for non remittance-receiving households than for those which do 
receive remittances (0.277 against 0.150). 
    Table 4  [about here] 
 
For certain categories of goods, the coefficients for each group are similar. This is notable in 
categories likely to include a significant amount of essential consumption such as food (0.185 and 0.175) 
and general household goods (0.191 and 0.189). For households which do not receive remittances, 
increased land holdings have the effect of decreasing farm and food consumption , as one would expect. 
For households which do receive remittances, increased ownership of farmland does not appear to 
influence consumption of food or farming. 
In the investment category, the two groups exhibit significantly different consumption patterns. 
Households which receive remittances do not exhibit a marginal propensity to invest in production or 
pensions significantly different to zero. Those which do not receive remittances invest a large proportion 
of their marginal income, exhibiting a marginal propensity to invest of 0.330. These households also 
dedicate a proportion of increases in the value of fixed assets to investment (MPC=0.351). 
The loan dummy is significantly positive for investment consumption for non-remittance 
receiving households (0.569) indicating that individuals borrow in order to invest. The loan dummy is 
significantly positive for food consumption for households which did not receive remittances (0.142) but 
not significantly different from zero for those that did. This result might indicate substitutability between 
credit and remittance income. Households which could not use remittance income to purchase food had to 
turn to credit; 27% of loans were taken out in order to purchase food. A similar explanation applies for 
general household and health expenses. 
The constant is not significantly different from zero for either group for education and investment 
consumption. This is unsurprising given that these categories are non-essential. In the case in which 
income falls to zero, one can expect households to reduce consumption of these goods to close to zero. 
The zero constant on farm consumption may indicate that this category is also seen as non-essential. It 
does not provide any short-term return and, during short periods, such consumption may be reduced to a 
minimum. 
Households which receive remittances have lower reported income than non-receivers (MK14,212 
against MK10,999) and this is the case even following the inclusion of remittances in total income. It is 
therefore possible that the differences between remittances receivers and non-receivers include a wealth 
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effect. This hypothesis is tested by further splitting the sample into households of above and below 
median income of MK3,347
26
. 
The potential for capturing an income effect rather than a remittance effect is investigated by 
splitting the sample into households above and below the median income line. Results are reported for 
total consumption, food, education, health, general household items, clothing, farm and investment 
consumption categories. Where remittances have an impact and poverty does not, similar coefficients 
should be observed for both low and high income groups which receive remittances and similar 
coefficients for both groups which do not receive remittances. Similarly, if income level has an impact 
and remittances do not, similar coefficients should be seen for both low-income groups regardless of 
whether or not they receive remittances. If both poverty and remittances matter, we should see differing 
coefficients amongst all four sub-groups. The results indicate that both the receipt of remittances and the 
income-level of a household influence its consumption choices. This is in line with theories of 
remittances as well as standard economic theories such as Engel’s law. Furthermore, there appears to be 
considerable interaction between income and receipt of remittances.  
Analysing total consumption, it can be observed that remittance-receiving households have a 
higher marginal propensity to save than households of a similar income-level which do not receive 
remittances. Remittances may act as a “disciplining device” encouraging prudence and the result is in line 
with research which suggests remitters often attach conditions to the usage of their money. 
The loan dummy is strongly positive and significant for below-median households which do not 
receive remittances for food and general household items – both essentials. This supports the theory that 
lower income households which do not receive remittances need to access credit in order to purchase 
essential items. The loan dummy is also significantly positive for higher income households in the 
investment category. Thus two groups appear to access credit: poorer households which cannot rely on 
remittances and need credit at times in order to survive, and richer ones which borrow to invest. These 
results support the hypothesis that both credit and remittances are used as a means of smoothing 
consumption
27
. 
The link between food consumption and farming income offers further insight into the impact of 
remittances on consumption behaviour; the farm income dummy is significantly positive for lower 
income households which do not receive remittance income, but not significantly different from zero for 
those which do. Thus, low-income households which receive remittances prefer to use this money rather 
than farm income. Low-income households which do not receive remittance income have no choice but to 
spend their farming income on food. In the case of above-median income households, the receipt of farm 
                                                 
26
 This method results in classifying as “low income” largely the same households deemed to be “poor” as the Malawian National Statistical 
Office in their generation of a poverty threshold using daily consumption. See NSO (2000), “Poverty Profile in Malawi”. 
27
 Udry (1990) finds that loan repayments in Northern Nigeria are sensitive to shocks received by the lending household. 
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income also reduces consumption of food for those which receive remittances compare with those which 
do no. Similar results can be seen for general household itesm which also incorporates many essential 
items. 
Low-income households which receive remittance income tend not consume out of their fixed 
assets; all other groups do. This is particularly evident with respect to food, clothing and general 
household items. Below-median income households which do not receive remittances do consume out of 
fixed assets (perhaps borrowing against them) whilst those that do receive remittances choose not to 
consume out of their fixed assets. 
All groups analysed consume out of liquid assets: this is unsurprising since the point of these 
assets is to turn them into cash for consumption (or savings/investment). Income appears to influence the 
use of this form of income more than the receipt of remittances. For example, above-median income 
households use these assets to help fund education and health, whilst below-median income households 
tend not to. Business income is used to increase consumption of most categories analysed. 
The marginal propensity to spend on education for remittance-receiving, low-income households 
is greater than unity. The receipt of remittances serves to increase the share of education in total 
household consumption. This offers support to research which shows that remittances are often 
designated for specific purposes such as education. 
Results are reported in tables 5.1 to 5.9
28
, and control variables are removed for clarity.  
 
                                    Table 5.1 to 5.9  [about here] 
Levin (1998) tests MPC out of different wealth categories; he groups together all income sources into one 
current income variable, and finds that the MPC out of current income is higher than it is for changes in 
housing wealth or future income. He then tests the theory that external liquidity constraints can explain 
the low MPC out of these illiquid assets, concluding that they can not. 
This paper tests for MPC different categories of good out of different income and wealth sources. 
The different MPCs for each current income source means that no such test is necessary – all cash income 
is equally liquid, so any constraints are necessarily internally imposed. 
It is possible however that those households that do not spend out of increases in the value of 
illiquid assets such as their homes do so because of liquidity constraints. This seems unlikely for two 
reasons: firstly over 17% of households surveyed reported having accessed credit during the year 
preceding the survey. Secondly, low-income households which do not receive remittances exhibit a 
tendency to consume essential goods out of fixed assets, with there being some evidence of these 
households actually raising credit against these assets. 
                                                 
28
 The low sample size for some of the regressions is unfortunate but is the result of analysing the different groups. Because of 
this, this section has sought to look at the overall results presented in tables 5.1 to 5.9. 
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 We verify the hypothesis however by regressing the log of total consumption on the log of total 
income (this time including remittances
29
), the log of the value of liquid and illiquid assets and all control 
variables. 
                                    Table 6  [about here] 
The sample is split into households which had accessed credit during the 12 months previous to the 
survey, and those which had not. For both groups, the MPC out of fixed assets is positive and significant, 
suggesting that any zero coefficients on this variable are not due to (externally-imposed) liquidity 
constraint. The similarity of the coefficients in general also indicates that there are no systematic 
differences between the two groups. 
 
4. Summary and Concluding Remarks:  
The results offer support for the use of mental accounting models in Malawi. Households do not, in 
general, lump all income together, but choose to allocate income differently. Both income level and 
receipt of remittances have a role in determining consumption patterns. 
 This paper has extended the theoretical work of Levin (1998) in order to show that household in a 
developing country choose to consume differently out of equally liquid forms of income. The findings 
support the implicit assumption in many studies of remittances that households regard this flow of income 
as distinct from others and thus choose to use it differently. Furthermore it offers evidence that the reason 
for this lies, at least in part, in mental accounting. The results are consistent with Adams (2002) who finds 
that households are more likely to save out of remittance income than other sources, but offers an 
alternative explanation. In addition to simply analysing the consumption/savings trade-off, we extend 
Adams (2002) work by looking at how remittances are spent and how their receipt may alter behaviour.  
Remitters may require receiving households to use this income in order to fund education, 
increasing the total share of education in total household consumption.. Furthermore, remittances are 
more likely to be saved than some other forms of income. 
Households which had accessed credit exhibit similar consumption patterns to those which did 
not. The differences observed in MPC out of current income and asset income is not due to liquidity 
constraints, but is rather a choice made by individual households. 
Policy formulation by governments, NGOs and credit or savings institutions need to take account 
of mental accounting models since these influence consumption and savings habits. Remittances should 
be encouraged in Malawi since they encourage savings and consumption of education. Furthermore, 
remittances are often used to fund necessary consumption such as food and household goods. Current 
projects to help reduce the costs of remittances are a step in the right direction.  
                                                 
29
 There is no reason to exclude remittances from total income in this case. 
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Banks are more likely to be successful in attracting household funds if they encourage the saving 
of particular forms of income, notably remittances. On the lending side, micro-finance organisations must 
not only improve access to credit, but must ensure that mental accounting models encourage the 
“constructive” use of credit; targeted publicity may help to support this aim. Lending institutions 
requiring collateral may be unsuccessful if mental accounting does not permit households to consume out 
of these assets. 
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Appendix 1: Description  of Variables 
The data from IHS98 comes in a rather raw format. Some information was collected on an individual basis and other 
information for the household, and there is much scope for duplication of information. Where necessary, checks for duplication 
were made and duplicates dropped 
 Inflation Adjustment Issues 
The survey was carried out from November 1997 to October 1998 during which time the country experienced a relatively high 
inflation rate: International Financial Statistics
30
 show an inflation rate of 29.75% during 1998. Furthermore prices vary 
considerable around the country and in particular between urban and rural areas
31
. During the survey, information was 
collected on local prices in each of the 29 regions where the survey was carried out. This information was then used to 
construct monthly food, non-food and total price indexes for each region. These price indexes correspond more closely to the 
purchases of the households surveyed and are more detailed than the inflation data collected by the Reserve Bank of Malawi. 
All monetary values are adjusted according to the time the household was surveyed and the region in which they are situated. 
 
This adjustment presents no difficulties where the data were collected at a specific point in time or where the recall period was 
relatively short, but posed problems where the recall period was longer or where there was missing information as to the month 
in which the household completed the survey.  
 
Consumption Variables 
 
Variable  Description  
Cons(food) This information is gathered from a diary which each 
household kept for an average of 26 days. The data was 
annualised, placed in per adult equivalent and then 
adjusted for inflation. 
Cons(farm) This consists of food crops and livestock expenditure. 
Since most farms are small holdings, this forms part of 
the household consumption. The recall period for this 
consumption was 12 months. Data in yearly, inflation-
adjusted PAE terms. 
Cons(clothing) This includes all clothing consumption for the household. 
The recall period was 3 months, and consumption is 
annualised, adjusted for inflation and placed in PAE 
terms. 
Cons(health) Household health consumption. The recall period was 12 
months, and consumption is annualised, adjusted for 
inflation and placed in PAE terms. 
Cons(household / 
General Household) 
This includes consumption of utensils, personal and 
household hygiene, linen, communication (stamps, 
newspapers, telephone,…) and basic house repair and 
transport costs. Consumption is annualised, adjusted for 
inflation and placed in PAE terms. 
Cons(invest) This includes productive investment – for example in 
industry, and investment in pensions/life insurance. The 
recall period was 12 months, and consumption is 
annualised, adjusted for inflation and placed in PAE 
terms. 
Cons(durables) Consumption of durable goods including appliances such 
as televisions, furniture and newly purchased vehicles. 
Not used as a dependent variable since durable goods 
also provide a stream of services/income which are used 
to explain the purchase of such goods. 
Cons(remittances) Remittances sent by the household. 
Cons(fuel) Household fuel consumption. The recall period was 
approximately 1 month, and consumption is annualised, 
adjusted for inflation and placed in PAE terms. 
Cons(other) Includes legal fees and fines, and an “other” category for 
                                                 
30
 Accessed through www.esds.ac.uk. 
31
 This is discussed in the National Statistical Office’s own series of studies through the Poverty Monitoring System of the Government of 
Malawi. See “Deriving a household welfare indicator for households surveyed in the Malawi IHS98”, June 2000. 
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goods which did not fall into any of the other categories 
in the diary kept by the surveyed households. 
Cons(business) Household business expenditure. The recall period was 1 
month, and expenditure is annualised, adjusted for 
inflation and placed in PAE terms. 
Cons(cashcrops) Household expenditure on cash crops. The recall period 
was 12 months, and expenditure is annualised, adjusted 
for inflation and placed in PAE terms. 
Cons(total) 
 
Income Variables 
 
Variable  Description  
Inc(salary) Wage or salary income earned by members of the 
household. The recall period was one month. The data 
was annualised, placed in per adult equivalent and then 
adjusted for inflation. 
Inc(farm) This consists of food crops and livestock income. Since 
most farms are small holdings, this forms part of the 
household income. The recall period for this income was 
12 months. Data in yearly, inflation-adjusted PAE terms. 
Inc(remittances) Remittance income for the household The recall period 
was 1 month, and income is annualised, adjusted for 
inflation and placed in PAE terms. 
Inc(loan) Credit income for the household. The recall period was 
12 months, and credit value is annualised, adjusted for 
inflation and placed in PAE terms. Since credit is likely 
to be a function of income (i.e. determined after other 
income is known) I do not include it in the regression as 
it is, but rather control for loan income using a dummy. 
Income is annualised, adjusted for inflation and placed in 
PAE terms. 
Inc(other) This includes income from past investments and an 
“other” category not determined in the survey results. 
Income is annualised, adjusted for inflation and placed in 
PAE terms. 
Inc(cashcrops) This includes income from sales of cash crops. The recall 
period was 12 months, and income is annualised, 
adjusted for inflation and placed in PAE terms. 
Inc(business) Business income. The recall period was 1 month, and 
income is annualised, adjusted for inflation and placed in 
PAE terms. 
Inc(total) 
 
Asset Variables 
 
Variable  Description  
Assets(fixed) This is the inflation adjusted value of illiquid assets 
owned by the household. This includes housing and land. 
The survey recorded the current value of such assets as 
indicated by the head of the household. The value is 
adjusted for inflation. 
Assets(liquid) This is the inflation adjusted value of liquid assets owned 
by the household. This includes livestock ownership and 
items such as cars or household appliances. The survey 
recorded the current value of such assets as indicated by 
the head of the household. The value is adjusted for 
inflation. 
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Non-cash Consumption Variables 
This information is not used in regressions due to the nature of the paper but is presented here to help interpretation of the 
summary statistics. Since non-cash consumption is common in Malawi, it is essential to give an idea as to its importance.  
 
Variable  Description 
Cons(in-kind food) Food consumption which was not paid for by cash. The 
source is either gift, own production or (occasionally) 
barter. The recall period for this expenditure was 3 days. 
Data in yearly, inflation-adjusted PAE terms. 
Cons(in-kind other) This consists of any non-food item not purchased in cash. 
This particularly includes firewood collected by the 
household. The recall period for this consumption was 3 
days. Data in yearly, inflation-adjusted PAE terms. 
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Appendix 2: Means and Regressions 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Household Characteristics 
Age: <25 10698 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Age: 26-45 10698 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age: 46-65 10698 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Age: >65 10698 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Dummy(male head) 10698 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Dummy(agriculture) 10698 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Dummy(married) 10698 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Household Size 10698 4.31 2.35 1 18 
Per Adult Equivalent 10698 3.68 2.01 1 14.75 
Dummy(children) 10698 0.76 0.42 0 1 
Number of Children 10698 2.01 1.74 0 12 
Education Level (0-6) 10405 2.22 1.54 0 6 
Dummy(urban) 10698 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Acres of Land Owned 10698 1.58 1.79 0 49 
Income 
Inc(farm) 3918 1,374 2,663 4 52,345 
Inc(salary) 2703 22,490 61,711 15 1,128,000 
Inc(remittances) 2216 4,736 13,096 12 308,520 
Inc(credit) 1830 3,029 20,672 2 500,000 
Inc(invest) 411 17,265 64,083 58 900,000 
Inc(cashcrops) 2573 5,210 14,456 8 372,000 
Inc(business) 2327 191,611 2,823,451 132 86,400,000 
Inc(total) 6490 13,311 52,749 4 1,202,400 
Consumption 
Cons(housing) 2067 6,456 28,711 9 760,320 
Cons(fuel) 7974 833 2,818 9 102,254 
Cons(clothing) 6319 1,954 4,714 4 189,298 
Cons(utensils) 2369 606 1,162 3 18,000 
Cons(linen) 3262 528 763 0 13,668 
Cons(hygiene) 8178 551 1,390 5 53,176 
Cons(communication) 1446 937 1,713 1 19,246 
Cons(household)* 9124 9,874 23,965 5 860,561 
Cons(farm) 5042 844 2,100 1 102,207 
Cons(health) 5407 494 2,364 1 82,420 
Cons(vehicle upkeep) 906 2,401 8,591 2 137,500 
 Cons(education) 1132 3,214 8,355 2 108,608 
Cons(invest) 278 5,165 11,366 5 99,362 
Cons(fees) 804 4,891 12,581 3 105,450 
Cons(food) 9065 5,137 8,969 5 247,890 
Cons(remittances) 2361 4,590 24,741 1 960,000 
Cons(appliances) 2306 951 4,088 1 133,602 
Cons(vehicles purchase) 65 16,940 31,435 35 121,500 
Cons(furniture) 1936 666 3,216 3 87,000 
Cons(durables)* 3468 1,322 6,902 1 133,980 
Cons(cashcrops) 1773 1,908 4,798 0 70,620 
Cons(business) 1727 108,788 1,718,193 28 45,600,000 
Cons(total)* 10105 11,819 32,637 5 960,000 
Non-cash Consumption 
Cons(in-kind food) 6836 8281 9081 22 149851 
Cons(in-kind other) 876 2392 4990 144 113880 
Assets 
Assets(fixed) 9538 14838 132021 24 10000000 
Assets(liquid) 10492 8795 87232 2 5286000 
        *Indicates a consumption category which is the sum of several other groups of consumption included in the table. 
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Table 2: Total Consumption from Different Income Sources 
OLS Regression - Dependent Variable: Total Consumption (excluding durables) 
Regression 1  2  3  4  5  6  
Income(total) 0.232***     0.233*** 
  (20.824)     (20.760)    
Income(salary)  0.422***   0.295***               
   (16.514)   (2.961)               
Income(remittances)   0.181***  0.191**               
    (10.103)  (2.303)               
Income(farm)    0.211*** 0.107               
     (15.057) (1.254)               
Income(total)*Dummy(remittances)      -0.006    
       (-0.656)    
Assets(fixed) 0.133*** 0.063*** 0.129*** 0.183*** 0.165* 0.133*** 
  (11.150) (3.382) (5.873) (11.484) (1.875) (11.146)    
Assets(liquid) 0.136*** 0.162*** 0.141*** 0.102*** 0.131 0.136*** 
  (13.754) (9.393) (7.738) (8.060) (1.554) (13.759)    
Dummy(loan) 0.176*** 0.133** 0.145** 0.187*** 0.171 0.177*** 
  (5.284) (2.278) (2.407) (4.631) (0.818) (5.290)    
Dummy(business) 0.302*** 0.188*** 0.329*** 0.332*** 0.478** 0.303*** 
  (9.437) (3.149) (5.621) (8.621) (2.109) (9.450)    
Dummy(salary) 0.148***  0.498*** 0.535***  0.147*** 
  (3.778)  (7.289) (11.368)  (3.756)    
Dummy(remittances) -0.102*** 0.063  0.058  -0.096*** 
  (-3.282) (1.013)  (1.561)  (-2.955)    
Dummy(farm) 0.205*** 0.129** 0.117**   0.206*** 
  (6.297) (2.274) (2.252)   (6.321)    
Acres of Land -0.008 -0.025 0.009 0.006 -0.030 -0.007    
  (-0.858) (-1.373) (0.578) (0.559) (-0.491) (-0.831)    
Age: 26-45 0.010 0.106 0.134* -0.038 0.351 0.010    
  (0.256) (1.492) (1.869) (-0.755) (1.429) (0.249)    
Age: 46-65 0.006 0.078 0.069 -0.040 -0.034 0.006    
  (0.134) (0.986) (0.873) (-0.717) (-0.117) (0.127)    
Age: >65 0.005 0.003 0.209** -0.082 0.246 0.005    
  (0.085) (0.034) (2.150) (-1.183) (0.635) (0.082)    
Dummy(male head) 0.042 0.077 -0.021 0.021 -0.380 0.042    
  (1.100) (1.109) (-0.299) (0.450) (-1.142) (1.088)    
Dummy(agriculture) 0.020 0.037 0.042 -0.020 0.108 0.020    
  (0.760) (0.816) (0.905) (-0.640) (0.581) (0.761)    
Dummy(married) -0.040 -0.062 0.058 -0.029 0.398 -0.039    
  (-1.021) (-0.879) (0.819) (-0.613) (1.369) (-1.006)    
Number of Children -0.016 -0.039 -0.006 -0.010 -0.092 -0.017    
  (-0.997) (-1.382) (-0.204) (-0.485) (-0.791) (-1.003)    
Household Size 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.007    
  (0.604) (0.331) (0.181) (0.096) (-0.062) (0.603)    
Education 0.013 0.027* 0.014 -0.003 0.128* 0.013    
  (1.536) (1.831) (0.904) (-0.328) (1.975) (1.530)    
Constant 4.720*** 3.513*** 5.208*** 5.356*** 2.535** 4.717*** 
  (28.963) (13.456) (15.137) (12.152) (2.009) (28.926)    
         
N 5863 1747 1830 3572 110 5863 
r2 0.483 0.573 0.431 0.403 0.706 0.483 
F 118.28 50.695 30.045 52.862 3.834 115.761 
t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
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Table 3: Consumption of Different Goods from Different Income 
Dependant Variable exp_total exp_food exp_farm exp_clothing exp_health exp_household* exp_fuel 
                
Income(salary) 0.295*** 0.472*** 0.258 0.470*** 0.194 0.416*** 0.447*** 
  (2.961) (3.678) (1.295) (2.790) (1.125) (4.084) (4.040)    
Income(remittances) 0.191** 0.216** 0.225 0.190 -0.002 0.253*** 0.273*** 
  (2.303) (2.004) (1.490) (1.305) (-0.017) (2.936) (2.812)    
Income(farm) 0.107 0.151 0.155 0.034 0.098 0.116 0.184*   
  (1.254) (1.360) (0.955) (0.216) (0.656) (1.312) (1.842)    
Assets(fixed) 0.165* 0.102 0.394** 0.106 -0.169 0.113 0.087    
  (1.875) (0.909) (2.182) (0.691) (-1.113) (1.268) (0.900)    
Assets(liquid) 0.131 -0.049 -0.068 0.199 0.223 0.082 -0.070    
  (1.554) (-0.441) (-0.363) (1.380) (1.504) (0.940) (-0.750)    
Dummy(loan) 0.171 -0.000 -0.102 0.457 -0.462 0.240 0.336    
  (0.818) (-0.001) (-0.257) (1.361) (-1.253) (1.108) (1.351)    
Dummy(business) 0.478** 0.826** 0.137 0.210 -0.102 0.730*** 0.595**  
  (2.109) (2.640) (0.331) (0.485) (-0.279) (3.010) (2.275)    
Acres of Land -0.030 -0.009 -0.015 -0.019 0.110 -0.061 -0.234*** 
  (-0.491) (-0.113) (-0.138) (-0.186) (1.129) (-0.979) (-3.453)    
Age: 26-45 0.351 0.107 0.129 0.184 0.381 0.249 0.284    
  (1.429) (0.319) (0.265) (0.407) (0.819) (0.954) (0.968)    
Age: 46-65 -0.034 -0.037 0.127 -0.137 -0.207 0.032 0.098    
  (-0.117) (-0.097) (0.224) (-0.259) (-0.384) (0.107) (0.286)    
Age: >65 0.246 0.323 0.896 -0.298 -0.689 0.074 0.513    
  (0.635) (0.653) (1.261) (-0.449) (-0.979) (0.188) (1.139)    
Dummy(male head) -0.380 -0.471 0.151 0.371 0.310 -0.303 0.094    
  (-1.142) (-1.089) (0.239) (0.646) (0.562) (-0.882) (0.242)    
Dummy(agriculture) 0.108 0.147 0.419 0.352 0.233 0.091 0.334    
  (0.581) (0.606) (1.126) (1.062) (0.727) (0.472) (1.535)    
Dummy(married) 0.398 0.133 0.325 0.082 0.000 0.209 0.209    
  (1.369) (0.345) (0.554) (0.167) (0.001) (0.691) (0.606)    
Number of Children -0.092 -0.131 -0.127 -0.078 -0.225 -0.088 0.233*   
  (-0.791) (-0.875) (-0.583) (-0.387) (-1.058) (-0.739) (1.788)    
Household Size -0.006 0.091 0.025 0.040 0.199 0.006 -0.101    
  (-0.062) (0.737) (0.151) (0.248) (1.198) (0.063) (-0.929)    
Education 0.128* 0.142 -0.077 0.285** 0.236** 0.198*** 0.099    
  (1.975) (1.660) (-0.592) (2.272) (2.084) (2.989) (1.288)    
Constant 2.535** 1.184 0.467 -3.776* -1.305 1.398 -0.038    
  (2.009) (0.730) (0.206) (-1.850) (-0.637) (1.093) (-0.027)    
          
N 110 103 85 90 82 104 97 
r2 0.706 0.640 0.567 0.575 0.545 0.717 0.738    
F 3.834 2.752 1.375 1.660 1.292 4.000 4.124   
* Composite variable: see appendix1 for details. t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1% 
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Table 4: Comparing Remittance-Receiving Households with non-Remittance Households 
Consumption 
Category food education health  general household* 
Receive Remittances Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
           
Income(total) 0.185*** 0.175*** 0.150 0.277*** 0.201*** 0.178*** 0.191*** 0.189*** 
  (6.534) (11.486) (1.273) (4.059) (5.513) (7.814) (8.241) (15.147)    
Assets(fixed) 0.124*** 0.148*** 0.192** 0.130** 0.094** 0.186*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 
  (3.914) (9.431) (2.020) (2.478) (2.289) (7.873) (5.508) (11.446)    
Assets(liquid) 0.062** 0.099*** 0.230** 0.380*** 0.109*** 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.144*** 
  (2.322) (7.641) (2.230) (6.701) (3.222) (6.884) (6.191) (13.572)    
Dummy(loan) 0.065 0.142*** 0.094 -0.110 0.048 0.127** 0.084 0.130*** 
  (0.765) (3.220) (0.318) (-0.642) (0.450) (1.980) (1.222) (3.597)    
Dummy(business) 0.575*** 0.379*** -0.295 -0.100 0.029 0.057 0.532*** 0.333*** 
  (6.706) (8.928) (-1.059) (-0.581) (0.275) (0.937) (7.588) (9.574)    
Dummy(farm) -0.140 0.128** -0.275 -0.231 0.073 0.007 -0.117 0.091**  
  (-1.339) (2.575) (-0.643) (-1.098) (0.570) (0.101) (-1.364) (2.218)    
Dummy(salary) -0.060 0.288*** 0.306 -0.653*** -0.239* 0.020 -0.042 0.253*** 
  (-0.548) (5.381) (0.743) (-2.841) (-1.731) (0.260) (-0.471) (5.752)    
Acres of Land -0.023 -0.048*** -0.080* 0.002 -0.025 -0.036** -0.014 -0.029*** 
  (-1.147) (-3.870) (-1.685) (0.035) (-1.067) (-2.108) (-0.840) (-2.901)    
Age: 26-45 0.133 -0.076 0.314 -0.081 0.014 -0.041 0.079 -0.091**  
  (1.270) (-1.447) (0.850) (-0.378) (0.103) (-0.533) (0.916) (-2.101)    
Age: 46-65 0.077 -0.050 0.378 0.012 -0.028 -0.016 0.020 -0.030    
  (0.656) (-0.845) (0.953) (0.051) (-0.181) (-0.184) (0.208) (-0.617)    
Age:  >65 0.276* -0.156** 0.289 -0.157 0.174 0.118 0.113 -0.153**  
  (1.949) (-2.079) (0.607) (-0.441) (0.946) (1.047) (0.975) (-2.494)    
Dummy(male head) -0.129 0.032 0.328 -0.008 0.018 0.053 -0.110 0.048    
  (-1.276) (0.647) (0.874) (-0.037) (0.140) (0.732) (-1.330) (1.182)    
Dummy(agriculture) 0.043 -0.033 0.076 -0.050 0.161* -0.062 0.023 -0.058**  
  (0.641) (-0.955) (0.303) (-0.344) (1.865) (-1.210) (0.420) (-2.055)    
Dummy(married) -0.018 -0.013 0.110 -0.059 0.117 0.053 -0.002 -0.020    
  (-0.177) (-0.260) (0.310) (-0.282) (0.887) (0.720) (-0.022) (-0.481)    
Number of Children 0.008 -0.023 0.097 -0.040 0.019 0.008 -0.001 0.002    
  (0.188) (-1.039) (0.648) (-0.409) (0.353) (0.255) (-0.015) (0.096)    
Household Size 0.007 0.014 -0.059 0.054 -0.008 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006    
  (0.204) (0.837) (-0.525) (0.718) (-0.194) (-0.010) (-0.001) (-0.437)    
Education 0.023 0.024** -0.041 -0.019 -0.017 0.004 0.003 0.012    
  (1.048) (2.175) (-0.507) (-0.428) (-0.576) (0.233) (0.153) (1.365)    
Constant 4.921*** 4.471*** -0.159 -0.046 1.390** 0.720** 5.214*** 4.942*** 
  (10.805) (21.682) (-0.131) (-0.070) (2.418) (2.248) (13.976) (29.207)    
           
N 1032 3651 182 469 731 2334 1036 3673 
r2 0.393 0.434 0.659 0.545 0.408 0.351 0.495 0.545    
F 14.515 62.869 6.386 11.825 10.732 28.088 22.096 98.749   
 
Composite variable: see Appendix1 for details. t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%; Yes indicates remittance-receiving 
group, No indicates householdes n this group do not receive remittances. 
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Table 4 continued 
Consumption 
Category investment farm  clothing fuel  
Receive Remittances Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
           
Income(total) 0.191 0.330** 0.236*** 0.226*** 0.254*** 0.192*** 0.150*** 0.184*** 
  (0.532) (2.510) (6.693) (11.658) (6.898) (8.695) (5.547) (11.857)    
Assets(fixed) 0.052 0.351*** 0.203*** 0.175*** 0.154*** 0.128*** 0.164*** 0.178*** 
  (0.185) (3.225) (4.967) (7.838) (3.774) (5.606) (5.465) (11.182)    
Assets(liquid) 0.329 0.117 0.163*** 0.199*** 0.170*** 0.166*** 0.091*** 0.124*** 
  (1.584) (1.191) (4.629) (10.935) (4.747) (8.586) (3.558) (9.347)    
Dummy(loan) -0.356 0.569** -0.024 0.151*** -0.010 -0.012 0.108 0.029    
  (-0.297) (1.996) (-0.236) (2.711) (-0.090) (-0.183) (1.362) (0.649)    
Dummy(business) -0.023 0.548* 0.264*** 0.128** 0.322*** 0.251*** 0.193** 0.227*** 
  (-0.029) (1.771) (2.592) (2.336) (2.942) (4.225) (2.421) (5.289)    
Dummy(farm) -0.957 -0.540 0.395*** 0.319*** 0.037 0.029 -0.048 0.012    
  (-0.661) (-1.346) (2.972) (4.881) (0.270) (0.415) (-0.481) (0.239)    
Dummy(salary) -0.824 -0.683 -0.165 -0.109 -0.060 0.149** -0.030 0.084    
  (-0.793) (-1.504) (-1.215) (-1.564) (-0.425) (1.980) (-0.294) (1.540)    
Acres of Land -0.274 0.078 0.037 0.111*** -0.009 -0.004 -0.036* -0.100*** 
  (-1.414) (0.700) (1.584) (7.242) (-0.371) (-0.233) (-1.914) (-8.020)    
Age: 26-45 -1.643* 0.141 -0.106 0.044 -0.272* -0.148* -0.091 0.001    
  (-1.989) (0.352) (-0.833) (0.625) (-1.920) (-1.934) (-0.915) (0.025)    
Age: 46-65 -1.539 0.257 -0.039 0.014 -0.332** -0.046 -0.024 0.037    
  (-1.343) (0.589) (-0.269) (0.172) (-2.100) (-0.537) (-0.218) (0.597)    
Age:  >65 -1.131 0.080 0.027 -0.035 0.049 -0.249** 0.091 -0.049    
  (-0.917) (0.153) (0.151) (-0.348) (0.261) (-2.273) (0.679) (-0.631)    
Dummy(male head) -0.966 -0.566 -0.169 -0.031 0.090 0.059 0.107 0.069    
  (-0.691) (-1.481) (-1.287) (-0.468) (0.674) (0.792) (1.117) (1.353)    
Dummy(agriculture) -0.609 -0.521** 0.079 -0.008 0.184** -0.072 0.079 0.039    
  (-1.000) (-2.024) (0.933) (-0.176) (2.066) (-1.457) (1.232) (1.116)    
Dummy(married) 1.470 0.229 0.077 0.024 -0.141 -0.011 0.063 -0.013    
  (1.038) (0.618) (0.583) (0.355) (-1.053) (-0.145) (0.662) (-0.251)    
Number of Children -0.300 0.127 -0.011 0.013 -0.029 0.014 0.079* 0.015    
  (-0.711) (0.856) (-0.209) (0.454) (-0.506) (0.432) (1.882) (0.692)    
Household Size 0.281 -0.141 0.027 -0.012 0.034 -0.009 -0.042 -0.018    
  (0.855) (-1.269) (0.646) (-0.531) (0.782) (-0.375) (-1.279) (-1.058)    
Education -0.033 -0.068 -0.032 -0.003 -0.082*** -0.006 0.003 0.004    
  (-0.178) (-0.865) (-1.133) (-0.207) (-2.782) (-0.402) (0.124) (0.402)    
Constant 3.442 1.054 0.706 0.295 1.462** 2.633*** 3.142*** 2.509*** 
  (1.127) (0.790) (1.235) (0.963) (2.471) (8.897) (7.443) (12.140)    
           
N 41 135 785 2371 820 2737 939 3271 
r2 0.863 0.650 0.375 0.391 0.352 0.254 0.488 0.507    
F 3.041 7.041 9.859 33.205 9.558 20.871 19.368 75.261    
 
Composite variable: see Appendix1 for details. t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%; Yes indicates remittance-receiving 
group, No indicates householdes n this group do not receive remittances. 
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Table 5.1           Table 5.2 
  Total Consumption*    Food 
Receive 
Remittances Yes No   
Receive 
Remittances Yes No 
Income Level Low High Low High  Income Level Low High Low High 
                
Income(tota)l 0.178*** 0.292*** 0.236*** 0.484***   Income(total) 0.160*** 0.218*** 0.160*** 0.389*** 
  (4.550) (8.074) (12.334) (15.663)        (3.254) (5.375) (7.015) (12.352)    
Assets(fixed) 0.028 0.193*** 0.174*** 0.059***   Assets(fixed) -0.039 0.235*** 0.182*** 0.075*** 
  (0.639) (5.484) (8.398) (3.009)        (-0.726) (5.994) (7.560) (3.790)    
Assets(liquid) 0.137*** 0.135*** 0.119*** 0.126***   Assets(liquid) 0.135*** -0.003 0.094*** 0.075*** 
  (3.668) (4.415) (7.569) (7.125)        (2.975) (-0.081) (5.083) (4.209)    
Dummy(loan) 0.110 0.181* 0.227*** 0.079      Dummy(loan) 0.022 0.096 0.195*** 0.062    
  (0.987) (1.873) (4.339) (1.307)        (0.158) (0.904) (3.182) (1.028)    
Dummy(business) 0.386*** 0.354*** 0.306*** 0.159***   Dummy(business) 0.603*** 0.473*** 0.445*** 0.243*** 
  (3.437) (3.669) (6.203) (2.672)        (4.194) (4.375) (7.607) (4.099)    
Dummy(farm) 0.311* 0.060 0.445*** 0.225***   Dummy(farm) 0.136 -0.210* 0.311*** -0.058    
  (1.870) (0.562) (6.354) (3.850)        (0.644) (-1.787) (3.722) (-0.965)    
Dummy(salary) 0.168 -0.151 0.256*** 0.214***   Dummy(salary) 0.127 -0.101 0.273*** 0.270*** 
  (0.736) (-1.371) (2.967) (3.359)        (0.440) (-0.834) (2.741) (4.166)    
Constant 5.719*** 3.580*** 4.415*** 3.025***   Constant 5.540*** 4.101*** 3.111*** 3.352*** 
  (5.370) (7.599) (10.593) (10.566)       (4.431) (7.859) (2.898) (11.657)    
                
N 503 662 2290 1743   N 440 592 2069 1582 
r2 0.379 0.514 0.393 0.538      r2 0.298 0.481 0.298 0.495    
F 6.676 14.456 32.967 43.965    F 4.118 11.505 19.990 35.014   
 
* Composite variable: see Appendix1 for details. t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%; Yes indicates remittance-receiving group, No indicates householdes n this group do not 
receive remittances; Low indicates that households of below-median income level are included in the regression, High.indicates above-median income households are included 
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Table 5.3          Table 5.4 
  Education    Health 
Receive 
Remittances Yes No  
Receive 
Remittances Yes No 
Income Level Low High Low High   Income Level Low High Low High 
               
Income(tota)l 1.271*** 0.200 0.068 0.558***   Income(total) 0.177*** 0.195*** 0.208*** 0.347*** 
  (3.724) (1.226) (0.397) (5.657)        (3.032) (3.432) (6.354) (6.864)    
Assets(fixed) -0.094 0.167 0.120 0.080      Assets(fixed) 0.157** 0.050 0.171*** 0.160*** 
  (-0.332) (1.530) (0.870) (1.412)        (2.259) (0.935) (4.723) (4.979)    
Assets(liquid) -0.078 0.384*** 0.173 0.356***   Assets(liquid) 0.072 0.133*** 0.085*** 0.144*** 
  (-0.337) (2.921) (1.204) (5.600)        (1.374) (2.814) (3.116) (4.994)    
Dummy(loan) 0.408 0.021 -0.246 -0.133      Dummy(loan) -0.052 0.109 0.144* 0.053    
  (0.823) (0.056) (-0.746) (-0.659)        (-0.320) (0.745) (1.699) (0.546)    
Dummy(business) -1.831** -0.673* 0.037 -0.293      Dummy(business) 0.052 -0.058 0.112 -0.021    
  (-2.485) (-1.898) (0.102) (-1.461)        (0.323) (-0.398) (1.394) (-0.221)    
Dummy(farm) -3.501** -0.428 -1.651** -0.084      Dummy(farm) 0.352 0.041 0.045 -0.114    
  (-2.356) (-0.797) (-2.168) (-0.373)        (1.547) (0.251) (0.368) (-1.180)    
Dummy(salary) -10.852** 0.593 -2.246** -0.584**    Dummy(salary) -0.185 -0.295* -0.131 0.182*   
  (-3.302) (1.264) (-1.996) (-2.321)        (-0.606) (-1.724) (-0.959) (1.755)    
Constant 16.321** -2.100 4.456** -2.231***   Constant 1.171 1.720** -2.630** -1.064**  
  (3.310) (-1.274) (2.053) (-2.740)        (0.934) (2.372) (-2.139) (-2.294)    
               
N 41 141 135 334   N 296 435 1259 1075 
r2 0.953 0.652 0.580 0.563      r2 0.353 0.445 0.184 0.441    
F 5.084 4.528 3.489 8.929     F 3.381 7.111 6.515 18.953  
 
t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%; Yes indicates remittance-receiving group, No indicates householdes n this group do not receive remittances; Low indicates that households of 
below-median income level are included in the regression, High.indicates above-median income households are included 
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Table 5.5          Table 5.6 
  General Household Items*    Investment 
Receive 
Remittances Yes No  
Receive 
Remittances Yes No 
Income Level Low High Low High   Income Level High Low High 
              
Income(tota)l 0.153*** 0.232*** 0.165*** 0.462***   Income(total) 0.327 0.380* 0.400    
  (4.009) (6.796) (8.950) (17.705)        (0.345) (1.770) (1.588)    
Assets(fixed) 0.032 0.212*** 0.183*** 0.062***   Assets(fixed) -0.276 0.389 0.365*** 
  (0.757) (6.450) (9.330) (3.773)        (-0.398) (1.323) (2.654)    
Assets(liquid) 0.194*** 0.085*** 0.128*** 0.121***   Assets(liquid) 0.451 0.222 0.054    
  (5.511) (3.009) (8.563) (8.257)        (0.627) (0.630) (0.390)    
Dummy(loan) 0.022 0.159* 0.161*** 0.049      Dummy(loan) -0.113 -0.183 0.759*   
  (0.207) (1.782) (3.240) (0.971)        (-0.056) (-0.357) (1.994)    
Dummy(business) 0.571*** 0.456*** 0.411*** 0.195***   Dummy(business) -0.069 1.826** 0.493    
  (5.092) (5.020) (8.653) (3.970)        (-0.043) (2.478) (1.250)    
Dummy(farm) 0.182 -0.190* 0.243*** -0.064      Dummy(farm) -3.704 1.797 -0.568    
  (1.112) (-1.928) (3.586) (-1.307)        (-0.690) (0.773) (-1.194)    
Dummy(salary) 0.196 -0.132 0.272*** 0.219***   Dummy(salary) -1.284 -0.665 -1.325*   
  (0.889) (-1.306) (3.367) (4.085)        (-0.692) (-0.938) (-1.780)    
Constant 4.370*** 4.549*** 4.602*** 3.384***   Constant 4.583 -6.775 1.194    
  (4.620) (10.384) (5.263) (14.209)        (0.630) (-1.348) (0.666)    
              
N 444 592 2086 1586   N 30 37 98 
r2 0.375 0.556 0.384 0.606      r2 0.885 0.734 0.546    
F 5.872 15.548 29.636 55.112     F 1.232 2.205 2.960   
 
* Composite variable: see Appendix1 for details. t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%; Yes indicates remittance-receiving group, No indicates households n this group do not 
receive remittances; Low indicates that households of below-median income level are included in the regression, High. indicates above-median income households are included. Investment regression for low-income 
remittance receivers excluded due to lack of observations. 
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Table 5.7          Table 5.8 
  Clothing    Farm 
Receive 
Remittances Yes No  
Receive 
Remittances Yes No 
Income Level Low High Low High   Income Level Low High Low High 
               
Income(tota)l 0.168*** 0.286*** 0.135*** 0.547***   Income(total) 0.204*** 0.253*** 0.229*** 0.431*** 
  (2.790) (5.215) (4.090) (11.642)        (3.545) (4.682) (8.145) (9.349)    
Assets(fixed) 0.047 0.240*** 0.159*** 0.058**    Assets(fixed) 0.209*** 0.196*** 0.186*** 0.125*** 
  (0.702) (4.493) (4.300) (1.999)        (3.050) (3.601) (5.902) (3.930)    
Assets(liquid) 0.229*** 0.125*** 0.134*** 0.134***   Assets(liquid) 0.241*** 0.083* 0.215*** 0.166*** 
  (3.965) (2.693) (4.758) (4.994)        (4.276) (1.722) (8.586) (6.246)    
Dummy(loan) -0.103 0.093 0.020 -0.077      Dummy(loan) 0.185 -0.132 0.282*** -0.052    
  (-0.591) (0.639) (0.222) (-0.858)        (1.179) (-0.964) (3.797) (-0.616)    
Dummy(business) 0.466*** 0.236 0.361*** 0.101      Dummy(business) 0.325** 0.226 0.119* 0.115    
  (2.648) (1.637) (4.400) (1.171)        (2.088) (1.586) (1.672) (1.332)    
Dummy(farm) 0.492* -0.104 0.025 -0.018      Dummy(farm) -0.020 0.630*** 0.157 0.360*** 
  (1.858) (-0.632) (0.211) (-0.204)        (-0.084) (3.781) (1.350) (4.546)    
Dummy(salary) 0.336 -0.205 0.213 0.074      Dummy(salary) 0.073 -0.200 -0.245* 0.061    
  (0.971) (-1.235) (1.541) (0.764)        (0.213) (-1.228) (-1.822) (0.696)    
Constant 2.369* 0.488 3.101** 0.283      Constant 1.446 1.142 1.961** -1.233*** 
  (1.780) (0.691) (2.292) (0.665)        (1.144) (1.614) (2.340) (-2.691)    
               
N 326 494 1444 1293   N 339 446 1404 967 
r2 0.341 0.359 0.173 0.307      r2 0.381 0.353 0.387 0.411    
F 3.590 5.719 6.820 12.882    F 4.344 4.855 19.517 14.270    
 
t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%; Yes indicates remittance-receiving group, No indicates householdes n this group do not receive remittances; Low indicates that households of 
below-median income level are included in the regression, High.indicates above-median income households are included 
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Table 5.9 
  Fuel 
Receive 
Remittances Yes No 
Income Level Low High Low High 
       
Income(tota)l 0.069* 0.267*** 0.127*** 0.451*** 
  (1.722) (6.322) (5.822) (12.768)    
Assets(fixed) 0.162*** 0.176*** 0.185*** 0.124*** 
  (3.696) (4.325) (7.950) (5.638)    
Assets(liquid) 0.104*** 0.068* 0.083*** 0.115*** 
  (2.764) (1.944) (4.661) (5.817)    
Dummy(loan) 0.203* 0.094 0.094 -0.089    
  (1.843) (0.852) (1.606) (-1.310)    
Dummy(business) 0.078 0.245** 0.217*** 0.213*** 
  (0.695) (2.208) (3.890) (3.217)    
Dummy(farm) 0.339* -0.132 0.184** -0.139**  
  (1.904) (-1.067) (2.247) (-2.071)    
Dummy(salary) -0.411* -0.120 0.153 0.047    
  (-1.701) (-0.952) (1.592) (0.647)    
Constant 0.446 1.927*** 1.394** 0.560*   
  (0.483) (3.597) (1.966) (1.757)    
       
N 384 555 1813 1458  
r2 0.359 0.547 0.255 0.587    
F 4.682 13.985 14.102 46.741   
 
t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%; Yes indicates remittance-receiving group, No indicates householdes n this group do not receive remittances; Low indicates that households of 
below-median income level are included in the regression, High.indicates above-median income households are included 
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Table 6 
Dependent_Variable: Total Consumption 
Credit Status pooled no_loan loan 
      
Income(total) 0.232*** 0.240*** 0.200*** 
  (20.824) (19.116) (8.148)    
Assets(fixed) 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.164*** 
  (11.150) (9.557) (6.100)    
Assets(liquid) 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.149*** 
  (13.754) (12.183) (6.155)    
Dummy(loan) 0.176***    
  (5.284)                    
Dummy(business) 0.302*** 0.296*** 0.319*** 
  (9.437) (8.110) (4.681)    
Dummy(farm) 0.205*** 0.241*** 0.043    
  (6.297) (6.630) (0.577)    
Dummy(salary) 0.148*** 0.158*** 0.125    
  (3.778) (3.602) (1.389)    
Dummy(remittances) -0.102*** -0.093*** -0.118*   
  (-3.282) (-2.641) (-1.739)   
Acres of Land Owned -0.008 -0.012 0.005    
  (-0.858) (-1.204) (0.251)    
Age: 26-45 0.010 0.009 -0.008    
  (0.256) (0.214) (-0.088)   
Age: 46-65 0.006 -0.012 0.025    
  (0.134) (-0.235) (0.237)    
Age: >65 0.005 0.007 -0.034    
  (0.085) (0.105) (-0.272)   
Dummy(male head) 0.042 0.041 0.023    
  (1.100) (0.950) (0.263)    
Dummy(agriculture) 0.020 0.023 0.005    
  (0.760) (0.789) (0.079)    
Dummy(married) -0.040 -0.014 -0.134    
  (-1.021) (-0.318) (-1.538)   
Number of Children -0.016 -0.009 -0.044    
  (-0.997) (-0.501) (-1.211)   
Household Size 0.007 -0.002 0.050*   
  (0.604) (-0.123) (1.787)    
Education 0.013 0.012 0.011    
  (1.536) (1.315) (0.579)    
Constant 4.720*** 4.854*** 4.336*** 
  (28.963) (26.481) (11.992)   
      
N 5863 4722 1141 
r2 0.483 0.494 0.465    
F 118.280 101.395 22.153  
 
t-ratios in parenthesis, coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
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